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INTRODUCTION 
GiveForward’s 50-page Memorandum in Support of Its Cross-for CDA immunity in this 
case can be summed up in one sentence: GiveForward believes that because it did not create the 
initial lie about KDH’s terminal illness and impending death GiveForward cannot be held 
accountable for any aspect of the KDH Fundraiser or any aspect of its own tortious conduct with 
regard to the KDH Fundraisers. Under GiveForward’s proposed theory, it is difficult to conceive 
when – if ever – the for-profit professional fundraising company, which proudly proclaims that it 
has collected over $150,000,000.00 in donations from United States citizens including citizens of 
Maryland, could be regulated by any state agency or found liable for any conduct related to a 
fundraiser on its online systems (unless GiveForward concocted the original story). 
As discussed more fully in Section II, GiveForward asks this Court to rule, in a matter of 
first impression for the entire federal and state judiciary, that the CDA provides immunity for 
professional fundraisers who engage in fundraising activities online and that the CDA precludes 
application of the state laws regulating fundraisers. Such a proposition is well beyond the scope 
or intended purpose of the CDA. Moreover it directly impedes states’ rights to regulate 
professional fundraisers. As the Fourth Circuit has noted, everyone benefits from state regulation 
of fundraising speech, even when state laws apply to a professional fundraiser who operates on a 
national scale, such as GiveForward. Center for Auto Safety Inc. v. Athey, 37 F.3d 139, fn 9 (4th 
Cir. 1994). 
Because GiveForward myopically focuses on Johnson’s lie or defamatory statement that 
KDH was dying, GiveForward relies upon certain cases – all of which involve claims of 
defamation – to support its primary contention—namely, that pursuant to the CDA GiveForward 
cannot be held accountable for the KDH Fundraiser because it did not create or materially 
contribute to the lie about KDH’s health. GiveForward blithely ignores the fact that Ms. Hodges 
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and KDH have brought no claim for defamation against GiveForward. 1  Moreover, Ms. 
Hodges and KDH do not contend that GiveForward made up the initial lie about KDH dying 
from a terminal illness. In repeating ad nauseam the fact that GiveForward did not make up the 
initial story about KDH dying from a terminal illness, GiveForward ignores the clear, 
comprehensive causes of action asserted against it. Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Counterclaims 
against GiveForward are brought as a result of GiveForward’s own role in posting a picture of an 
8-year-old child without parental permission; plastering that child’s name and likeness all over 
the Internet; tweeting about the child; communicating with donors about the child; failing to take 
any steps whatsoever to verify the veracity of the story; 2 etc. 
GiveForward’s Cross-Motion is overrun with misstatements and mischaracterizations of 
both fact and law. 3  These misstatements and mischaracterizations form the basis of 
GiveForward’s argument in support of summary judgment as to both GiveForward’s Complaint 
for declaratory relief and Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Counterclaims. Once the misstatements are 
stripped away, GiveForward’s Cross-Motion is unsubstantiated in fact or law. 
																																																								
1  See generally Countercl. [ECF 11]. 
2  If GiveForward had done even a modicum of due diligence, it would have uncovered, for instance, Johnson’s 
history of criminal domestic violence against Ms. Hodges – KDH’s only custodial parent – which is publically 
available on Maryland Judiciary Case Search. Also publicly available was the fact that a bench warrant had 
been issued for Johnson’s arrest during the time he and GiveForward were operating the fraudulent KDH 
Fundraiser. This bench warrant was for Johnson’s failure to pay child support owing to the mother of one of his 
other children. 
3  For instance, in support of its Cross-Motion, GiveForward relies heavily on (a) the deposition testimony of 
Kimani Johnson, (b) the declaration of Catina Harris, and (c) the affidavits of Ethan Austin, Erica Alhorn, and 
Caiti Stout. However, Johnson and Harris’ statements cannot be trusted. Johnson admits to having made up a 
story about his biological son dying and is a confirmed liar; GiveForward itself has openly acknowledged that 
Johnson lies. Harris, though she has made herself wholly available to GiveForward, is actively evading service 
of process and ignored the subpoena power of this Court, refusing to appear for her properly-noticed and 
subpoenaed deposition. Additionally, as detailed in the two Motions to Strike, which are filed contemporaneous 
to this Opposition and Reply, Austin, Alhorn and Stout’s affidavits should be struck, either entirely or partially, 
because they are comprised primarily of inadmissible conclusory statements of fact and law, and with respect to 
Alhorn and Stout, because GiveForward refused to make these fundraising coaches available for their properly 
noticed videoconference depositions. 
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In sum, GiveForward’s position – that the CDA permits it to engage in professional 
fundraising speech for profit without regulation because it operates on the Internet – is 
unsupported by the law. Accordingly, the Court should grant the Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment (the “Hodges Motion”) and deny GiveForward’s Cross-Motion. 
GIVEFORWARD’S MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT 
In its Cross-Motion, GiveForward makes various misstatements of fact, primarily in the 
Statement of Facts and Argument sections of the Memorandum. These misstatements of fact are 
detailed below and are contrasted with the actual facts in the record before the Court as 
supported by documentary evidence. 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 1: “The user muse also agree to GiveForward’s tersm of 
use.” 
ACTUAL FACT 1: GiveForward’s account creation process does not require users to take any 
affirmative action to express agreement to the terms of use, such as clicking on an “accept” or “I 
agree” button. 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 2: “Because Mr. Johnson did not have Internet access, he 
asked a friend, Catina Harris, to help him create the fundraiser. On March 19, 2013, at 
Mr. Johnson’s suggestion, Ms. Harris went to the GiveForward website to create an 
account and set up Mr. Johnson’s fundraiser.”4 
ACTUAL FACT 2: GiveForward’s documents show that Johnson did indeed have Internet access. 
Johnson viewed the emails GiveForward sent to his kimanimusic@gmail.com email address.5 
Johnson’s GiveForward user id logged into the KDH Fundraiser approximately 42 times.6 He 
also used the Internet to make multiple donations to the KDH Fundraiser.7 
																																																								
4  GF Mem. at 8, ¶ 11. 
5  GF_Hodges0000432 (Produced in Native) 
6  GF_Hodges0000448. 
7  Hodges Mot. at 25, ¶ 68. 
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MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 3: “Mr. Johnson provided all of the content for the KDH 
fundraiser.”8 “None of the content for the KDH fundraiser came from GiveForward.”9 
ACTUAL FACT 3: GiveForward created content for the KDH Fundraiser wholly independent of 
Johnson and/or Harris. Specifically, GiveForward, without any involvement or assistance from 
Johnson or Harris, exclusively created the “widget” that was then placed on third-party websites 
and directed Internet traffic to the KDH Fundraiser approximately 212 times.10 GiveForward also 
independently created the Tweet that advertised the KDH Fundraiser to every single follower of 
GiveForward’s Twitter feed as well as any member of the public who chose to look at 
GiveForward’s publicly available Twitter feed. 11  A search for “Kristian” and GiveForward 
revealed on “TweetBuzz” that the KDH Fundraiser was one of the most popular stories trending 
on GiveForward’s Twitter feed.12 As discussed more fully in the Argument, GiveForward’s 
automated emails are also independently created speech associated with content creation by 
GiveForward for the KDH Fundraiser and were not content provided by Johnson. GiveForward 
also independently created and sent thank you emails to donors and supporters of the KDH 
Fundraiser, promoting the fundraiser, and encouraging users to share it with their social media 
network.13 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 4: “The automated emails sent during the KDH fundraiser 
are listed on GF_Hodges 587-610. All of the automated emails were sent after 
publication of the KDH fundraiser.”14 
ACTUAL FACT 4: As explained infra, GiveForward completely misconstrues the meaning of 
“publication” and “speech.” Publication of speech associated with the KDH Fundraiser was an 
																																																								
8  GF GF Mem. at 8, ¶ 12. 
9  Id. at 9, ¶ 16. 
10  See Dec. 31, 2014 Ltr. from G. Spatz at 6, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
11  See, e.g., Hodges Mot. at 16, ¶¶ 38-39. 
12  See TweetBuzz Exhibit. 
13  Hodges Mot. at 16, ¶ 40. 
14  GF Mem. at 10, ¶ 18. 
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organic and ongoing process.. Under the law, speech associated with the KDH Fundraiser was 
continually “published” each time additional content or commentary was added,15 such as a hug, 
note from a donor, or loading the KDH Fundraiser widget to a third-party website. So while all 
of the automated emails may have been sent after initial publication of the KDH Fundraiser, the 
automated emails were still being sent by GiveFoward as the KDH Fundraiser was ongoing and 
each email was speech independently created by GiveForward that furthered the invasion of 
KDH’s privacy. Additionally, the KDH Fundraiser webpage was viewed a total of 1,523 times, 
was shared via Facebook 41 times, and received 54 donations.16 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 5: “The first interactions either Mr. Johnson or Ms. Harris 
had with anyone at GiveForward were on April 5, 2013 and April 8, 2013 when Ms. 
Harris called GiveForward about the process for receiving payment. Ms. Harris’ April 5, 
2013 and April 8, 2013 phone calls were the only times she ever had contact with anyone 
at GiveForward. […] All interaction between GiveForward and Mr. Johnson occurred 
after the fundraisers had closed and payment had been made to Mr. Johnson.”17 
ACTUAL FACT 5: This is directly contradicted by GiveForward’s own electronic evidence, which 
shows that GiveForward sent 190 emails to Johnson and Harris collectively throughout the 
pendency of the KDH Fundraiser.18 Johnson and Harris also interacted with GiveForward via its 
website throughout the pendency of the KDH Fundraiser. 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 6: “The KDH fundraiser ran from March 19, 2013 to April 
10, 2013 and raised $11,379.89. Prior to the end date, no user had flagged Mr. Johnson’s 
fundraiser as potentially fraudulent nor had GiveForward received any other indications 
of potential problems with the fundraiser.”19 
																																																								
15  Ms. Hodges and KDH discuss this in depth at section I. 
16  See Hodges Mot. at 22, ¶ 57. 
17  GF Mem. at 10, ¶ 20. 
18  See Hodges Mot. at 19, ¶ 53-54. 
19  GF Mem. at 11, ¶ 21. 
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ACTUAL FACT 6: As described by Christopher McKeever during his deposition, at the time of 
the KDH Fundraiser, GiveForward’s system had a number of donation-based triggers in place 
that would notify GiveForward’s fundraising coaches of possible suspicious activity in 
fundraisers. 20  With regard to the KDH Fundraiser, three (3) such notification emails were 
generated during the fundraiser. Email notifications were triggered twice by multiple donations 
made by Johnson on the same day.21 Whether they are called “flags” or “notifications,” the fact 
is: GiveForward knew of suspicious activity in the KDH Fundraiser as early as March 22, 2013. 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 7: “Three system notifications were generated for the KDH 
fundraiser. One on March 22, 2013 for a duplicate donation by Mr. Johnson in the 
amount of $20.00, one of March 26, 2013 for a duplicate donation by Mr. Johnson in the 
amount of $50.00.”22 
ACTUAL FACT 7: The March 22, 2013 email was generated by two separate donations by Mr. 
Johnson in the same day: one anonymous donation for $20.00, and a second for $45.00, posing 
as a donor named “Paris.”23 The March 26, 2013 email was also generated by two separate 
donations by Johnson in the same day: one for $15.00 and a second for $50.00 posing as a donor 
named “Anthony Belthy.”24 These are not “duplicate donations” but multiple donations made by 
the same user in the same day, which is suspicious and suggests potentially fraudulent activity – 
as was the case in the KDH Fundraiser. 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 8: “GiveForward also has system-generated notifications 
of certain donation activity. These notifications allow GiveForward to address donations 
that may have been made in error. These notifications also provide some fraud 
																																																								
20  McKeever Dep. Tr. 85:21-86:5. 
21  See Hodges Mot. at 24, ¶ 64. 
22  GF Mem. at 11-12, ¶ 23. 
23  Hodges Mot., Ex A at GF_Hodges0000547, 612. 
24  Id.		
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protection…. However, these system-generated notifications are not “flags” from the user 
community.”25 
ACTUAL FACT 8: As mentioned above, whatever these “notifications” are called – whether 
GiveForward’s “donation-based trigger” emails or Ms. Hodges and KDH’s “red flag notification 
emails”26 – the notification emails generated in the KDH Fundraiser in response to Johnson’s 
numerous donations alerted GiveForward as early as March 22, 2013 that there was suspicious 
activity in the KDH Fundraiser.27  And as McKeever testified, the purpose served by these 
notifications is to alert GiveForward to possible fraud.28 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 9: “On April 24, 2013, Ms. Hodges called GiveForward 
and spoke with Caiti Stout. Ms. Hodges informed Ms. Stout that her son was the subject 
of the fundraiser, that he was not sick, and that she believed the fundraiser was 
fraudulent. This was the first time GiveForward learned of any problems with the 
fundraiser.”29 
ACTUAL FACT 9: The red flag notification emails put GiveForward on notice of possible fraud in 
the KDH Fundraiser approximately one month prior to Ms. Hodges’ conversation with Caiti 
Stout, on March 22, 2013. McKeever’s testimony also confirms that repeated donations made by 
the organizer or one specific donor would raise a flag indicating possible suspicious activity.30 
GiveForward likewise was on notice because its systems collected data showing that Johnson 
was listed as beneficiary rather than the allegedly ill child. 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 10: “In their Motion, the Defendants recite twenty pages of 
alleged ‘facts.’ Most of the Defendants’ statement of facts is attorney argument and 
																																																								
25  GF Mem. at 11, ¶ 23. 
26  See, e.g., Reply on Mot. for Costs [ECF 114]. 
27  See Hodges Mot. at 24, ¶ 64. 
28  McKeever Dep. Tr. 85:21-86:5. 
29  GF Mem. at 12, ¶ 25. 
30  McKeever Dep. Tr. 85:21-86:5. 
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speculation…. Many of the Defendants’ ‘facts’ are not supported by any citations and 
should be stricken and disregarded on that basis alone.”31 
ACTUAL FACT 10: Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Statement of Facts is a painstaking, and frankly 
exhausting, summary of the relevant portions of electronic evidence produced by GiveForward, 
complete with extensive citation to GiveForward’s own documents. Ms. Hodges and KDH detail 
the precise language of GiveForward’s documentary evidence, emails, and the conduct and 
speech occurring in the fundraiser. 32 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 11: “…the Defendants raise arguments for the first time in 
their Summary Judgment Motion that GiveForward allegedly made ‘affirmative 
representations’ regarding its fraud prevention measures. Specifically, the Defendants’ 
[sic] argue that GiveForward failed to follow its alleged stated policies regarding fraud 
prevention. Despite the fact that these allegations are found nowhere in the Defendants’ 
Counterclaims….”33 
ACTUAL FACT 11: Paragraphs 10-12 of the Counterclaim specifically detail GiveForward’s 
publicly disseminated affirmative representations regarding its fraud prevention measures.34 Ms. 
Hodges and KDH even included an image of GiveForward’s fraud statement taken from its 
publicly available website.35 These allegations are then explicitly incorporated into each of the 
counts asserted in the Counterclaim.36 It is unclear why GiveForward would baldly misstate such 
a fact. 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 12: “Yet, it is undisputed that GiveForward had no 
involvement in creating the KDH fundraiser.”37 
																																																								
31  GF Mem. at 12-13. 
32  See Hodges Mot. at 6-26. Apparently, because GiveForward cannot actually refute any of the carefully detailed 
facts in the Motion, precisely because those facts are a recitation of the content of GiveForward’s documentary 
evidence, GiveForward lodges the factually and legally unsupported claim that Ms. Hodges and KDH’s facts 
“should be stricken.” 
33  GF Mem. at 25. 
34  See Countercl. ¶¶ 10-12. 
35  See id. at 13. 
36  See id. ¶¶ 30, 40, 49, 57, 66, 74, 83, 92, 100, 110, 119, 129, 142. 
37  GF Mem. at 35. 
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ACTUAL FACT 12: GiveForward’s involvement in creating the KDH Fundraiser has been 
extensively documented by Ms. Hodges and KDH. It does not even make sense for GiveFoward 
to say its role is “undisputed”—GiveForward’s involvement in creating and or developing the 
KDH Fundraiser is, for all intents and purposes, the entire point of contention between the 
Parties. 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 13: “In their Motion, the Defendants do not even attempt to 
explain how [the] Tweet allegedly contributed to the false claim that KDH was sick. 
Importantly, the Defendants do not contend that the content of this Tweet is in any way 
actionable.”38 
ACTUAL FACT 13: As detailed in Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Counterclaims and Answers to 
Interrogatories, 39  the Tweet by GiveForward was new content independently created by a 
GiveForward employee, published exclusively by GiveForward without any involvement from 
Johnson or Harris, and it further developed the KDH Fundraiser. Additionally, as repeatedly 
asserted by Ms. Hodges and KDH, in addition to increasing the reach of the KDH Fundraiser, the 
Tweet itself was an invasion of KDH’s privacy and, therefore, actionable.40 
MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 14: “…it is undisputed that GiveForward had no contact 
with Mr. Johnson or Ms. Harris during their creation of the KDH fundraiser and, 
therefore, GiveForward did not provide any support to them.”41 
ACTUAL FACT 14: Once again, contact between GiveForward’s electronic systems and Johnson 
and Harris during the creation of the KDH Fundraiser is heavily documented. GiveForward’s 
website provides significant and extensive support to all fundraiser organizers. For example, 
																																																								
38  GF Mem. at 39. 
39  See Countercl. ¶ 18; Ans. to Interrogs. at 6, attached hereto as Exhibit 2.. 
40  See generally Hodges Mot. 
41  GF Mem. at 41. 
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during the fundraiser set-up process at the time in question, in the spring of 2013 (and currently) 
GiveForward provided sample language and tips for creating a fundraiser.42 
 
Just because no human employee of GiveForward spoke with Johnson and/or Harris during the 
KDH Fundraiser set-up process does not mean that GiveForward did not, through its publicly 
facing website, have contact with Johnson and/or Harris. Stating that lack of human contact 
proves lack of a role in content creation and development reflects GiveForward’s recurring 
misunderstanding of online speech. 
																																																								
42  http://www.giveforward.com/fundraise/create#2; See also McKeever Dep. Tr. 
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MISSTATEMENT OF FACT 15: “In a letter to GiveForward, Ms. Hodges’s lawyer 
threatened to pursue GiveForward for a bevy of claims—all based on GiveForward’s 
publication of Mr. Johnson’s claim that his son had a terminal illness. After receiving 
another letter threatening imminent suit against GiveForward and promising heavy 
litigation burden, including the promise of ‘extensive discovery,’ ‘uncapped punitive 
damages,’ and a venue where ‘[s]ome of the largest jury verdicts in the state of Maryland 
hail from, GiveForward filed suit in a proper federal forum….”43 
ACTUAL FACT 15: As evidenced by the settlement communications that GiveForward once again 
impermissibly references in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 408, 44  in May 2013, 
undersigned counsel sent an initial settlement communication to GiveForward’s Co-Founders 
notifying them in writing of the facts associated with the fraudulent fundraiser and the problems 
with GiveForward’s appalling lack of a response thereto. This initial settlement communication 
contained no specific demand for money and made clear it was a settlement communication. In 
response thereto, on June 25, 2013, GiveForward’s counsel – Mr. George Spatz – specifically 
requested that Ms. Hodges prepare and send to him a “written” monetary settlement demand.45 
Thus, at Mr. Spatz’s specific direction, on June 26, 2013, undersigned counsel sent a second 
																																																								
43  GF Mem. at 3-4. 
44  Courts recognize the “importance of maintaining the confidentiality of settlement negotiations” because 
protecting these communications “encourages parties to enter into settlement agreements.” Porter Hayden Co. 
v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 466 (1998); see also Bittinger v. CSX Transp., Inc., 176 Md. App. 262, 276-77 
(2007) (“The purpose of Rule 5–408 is to encourage the settlement of lawsuits by ensuring parties need not fear 
that their desire to settle pending litigation and their offers to do so will be construed as admissions.”); Joseph F. 
Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook § 508(D) (3d ed. 1999) (“Offers of compromise are excluded 
because public policy encourages settlement.”); Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, Jones on Evidence 
§ 22:11.70 (7th ed.) (“If parties are permitted [. . . ] to put before the court through their pleadings the existence 
of settlement negotiations as a fact in support of the parties’ claim or defense, it circumvents the purpose of the 
Rule.”). The courts that have addressed the issue of admissibility of settlement communications have routinely 
struck settlement negotiations attached to or referenced in pleadings. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. v. Illumina, Inc., 
2013 WL 3216087, at *1-3, 22 (D. Del. June 25, 2013) (granting plaintiff’s motion to strike references to 
settlement negotiations); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BCG Partners, Inc., 2011 WL 3946581, *2 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 2, 2011) (striking references to settlement negotiations from amended complaint and noting that doing so 
“at this [pre-discovery] stage is not unusual”); Ogundule v. Girl Scouts–Ariz. Cactus Pine Council, Inc., 2011 
WL 1770784, *8-9 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2011) (striking exhibits to complaint that contained settlement material); 
U.S. ex rel. Alsaker v. Centracare Health Sys., Inc., 2002 WL 1285089, at *2 (D. Minn. June 5, 2002 ) 
(collecting cases). 
45  See Compl., Ex. B. 
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letter containing Ms. Hodges and KDH’s settlement demand and outlining the various 
jurisdictional considerations that likely would be unfamiliar to a Chicago, Illinois-based attorney. 
Mr. Spatz said he was talking to his client about the offer. In reality, Mr. Spatz and GiveForward 
engaged in a “rush to the courthouse” to sue then 8-year-old KDH and his mother.46 In response, 
GiveForward turned around and sued Ms. Hodges and then-8-year-old KDH. 
SUPPLEMENTAL PERTINENT FACTS 
1. GiveForward informs the Court that upon learning of the fraud “GiveForward 
promptly hid the fundraiser from public view and investigated Ms. Hodges’ claims.” 47 
GiveForward clearly had control over the KDH Fundraiser, yet despite being on notice that there 
was fraud involved (and, therefore, the possibility of litigation), GiveForward failed to preserve 
the content of the KDH Fundraiser and, as Ms. Hodges and KDH have previously pointed out, 
there is no way to now know what the KDH Fundraiser content was beyond the black and white 
screenshot Ms. Hodges was able to preserve. 
2. GiveForward’s electronic evidence establishes that on March 29, 2013, in direct 
response to GiveForward’s March 26, 2013 email stating “Fundraisers that make 4 updates, on 
average, raise $2,890 more than those without updates!,” Johnson and Harris made a substantive 
update to the KDH Fundraiser.48 
3. GiveForwaqrd’s late-produced electronic evidence establishes that donations 
made by Johnson in the name of others triggered two (2) email notifications to GiveForward of 
suspicious fundraiser activity and that in response thereto GiveForward did nothing. 
4. During his deposition, Johnson willingly admitted to lying to Monica Smothers, 
the previously unknown Good Samaritan who contacted Ms. Hodges on social media and 
																																																								
46  Wrigley Dep. Tr.  
47  GF Mem. at 12, ¶ 27. 
48  See Hodges Mot. at 20-21, ¶ 55. 
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advised her of the fraud, about visiting KDH in the hospital.49 Additionally, as a direct result of 
his fraudulent activities in the KDH Fundraiser, Johnson has been indicted in Prince George’s 
County, Maryland on three counts of theft.50 Nevertheless, GiveForward relies on Johnson’s 
deposition testimony to support its claim that GiveForward did not create or develop any content 
for the KDH Fundraiser.51 
5. As evidenced extensively in Ms. Hodges and KDH’s motion seeking to serve 
process on Harris via alternate means, Harris is actively evading service of process in this 
matter. 52  Harris, however, is working with GiveForward in this matter and provided 
GiveForward with a sworn declaration in support of its Cross-Motion.53 
ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the various arguments made by GiveForward in support of its Cross-Motion 
and in opposition to Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Motion, for the reasons discussed more fully below, 
GiveForward is neither entitled to summary judgment on its Complaint for declaratory relief nor 
entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Counterclaims.  
I. GIVEFORWARD MISUNDERSTANDS THE MEANING OF “PUBLICATION” 
AND WHAT CONSTITUTES SPEECH, CONTENT, AND PUBLICATION ON 
THE INTERNET. 
Throughout its Memorandum, GiveForward reiterates the bullheaded position that the 
only publication of speech that took place in this case was when Johnson and/or Harris initially 
uploaded the fraudulent story Johnson created about KDH dying of a terminal heart condition. 
GiveForward contends that its myriad complex activities and actions vis-à-vis the KDH 
Fundraiser are not speech or content, or even if such activities or actions could be determined to 
																																																								
49  See Johnson Dep. Tr. 107:15-20, attached hereto as part of Exhibit 3. 
50  See Exhibit 4 attached hereto. 
51  See GF Mem. __________. 
52  See generally Mot. for Alternate Service [ECF 127]. 
53  See Cross-Mot., Ex. E. 
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be speech or content, GiveForward cannot be liable because such actions or activities occurred 
“after” Johnson or Harris clicked publish on the KDH Fundraiser. GiveForward also repeatedly 
takes the position that its speech, actions, and activities done “after” Johnson or Harris hit the 
publish button on GiveForward’s website are not relevant because they occurred “after” 
Johnson’s lie about his son and, thus, cannot be considered speech or content development.54 
Finally, GiveForward alternately appears to admit it engaged in speech and content creation, but 
it curiously and repeatedly describes its own speech as “content-neutral.” More importantly, 
GiveForward’s position is unsupported by the extensive electronic record in this case, by its own 
systems, by its own interactions with and involvement in the KDH fundraiser and the fundraiser 
organizers and donors, and by its own speech. 
GiveForward argues that because it did not create the initial lie about KDH’s terminal 
illness and impending death, GiveForward cannot be held accountable for any aspect of the KDH 
Fundraiser or any aspect of its own tortious conduct with regard to the KDH Fundraiser. 
GiveForward’s position and legal arguments demonstrate fundamental misunderstandings about: 
what constitutes speech and content on the Internet; how actions and activities online are 
determined to be expressive speech and, hence, entitled to constitutional protection; who is a 
“speaker” for purposes of speech, content, and development; when publication of speech occurs; 
the essential role of states in regulating professional fundraisers/solicitors; and what the causes of 
action asserted against GiveForward in this case actually are. For instance, the term “content 
neutral” – which is peppered throughout GiveForward’s Cross-Motion – has no legal relevance, 
significance, or bearing on the determination of whether GiveForward engaged in speech that is 
content development, in whole or part, for purposes of the CDA. The term “content neutral” is an 
																																																								
54  GF Mem. at 44-46. 
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essential factor in a balancing test courts employ to determine whether statutory regulation of 
speech by the government is constitutional or an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.55  
The Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit broadly define what what constitutes speech, 
content, and publication of speech on the Internet. Speech and speech content can come in many 
forms. Thus, the Supreme Court has long held that non-verbal conduct may constitute speech,56 
and speech occurs wherever there is “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” that is 
accompanied by “surrounding circumstances” indicating a great “likelihood” that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it. Spence v. State of Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 411 
(1974). The case at hand involves online speech, and in terms of online speech, the Supreme 
Court has soundly rejected any notion that online speech is somehow not worthy of the same 
level of protection as other speech. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 840, 870 (1997); see 
generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
The fact that Johnson/Harris and GiveForward’s for-profit professional KDH Fundraiser 
occurred online and involved myriad expressive actions and activities not limited just to written 
words requires the Court to consider precisely what constitutes “speech” on the Internet. In other 
words, the Court must consider how clicks, button-pushes, automated emails, “likes” or “hugs,” 
and similar such actions and activities that are conducted online electronically and sometimes by 
automated systems are treated or considered for purposes of analyzing legal issues surrounding 
speech and speech content. Fortunately, the Fourth Circuit has issued on-point precedent that 
defines what constitutes speech in the new world of human interaction – social media and the 
Internet.  
																																																								
55  Courts specifically look to the language of the statute or ordinance restricting constitutionally-protected speech 
to determine if the restriction is drafted in such a way as to be “content neutral” in its application (of the 
restriction) to speech. See, e.g., Schneck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
56  See, e.g., Spence v. State of Wash., 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (a peace sign taped to a privately-owned U.S. flag is 
speech).	
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In Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit specifically 
considered what actions and activities may constitute speech on social media and online 
platforms where individuals express their interests, likes, preferences, and thoughts with the 
mere click of a button. In order to make a legal determination as to whether a sheriff’s office 
employee’s “likes” of a campaign page on Facebook were constitutionally protected speech, the 
Fourth Circuit queried whether clicking a button is speech and, if so, whether it is speech or 
content that is protected by the First Amendment or speech that may potentially subject the 
speaker to liability under tort law. 
Bland presented an online speech question of first impression for the Fourth Circuit; 
namely, do “likes” on Facebook amount to expressive speech entitled to constitutional 
protection? A lower district court in Virginia had held that “merely ‘liking’ a Facebook page 
[was] insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection.”57 In a careful and detailed opinion 
authored by Chief Judge Traxler, examining the nature of speech and expressive speech online 
and on social media platforms,58 the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s holding, finding 
that Facebook “likes” are constitutionally protected speech. Bland, 730 F.3d at 385-386.  
To answer the question of whether a Facebook “like” could constitute speech, the Fourth 
Circuit considered “as a factual matter, what it means to ‘like’ a page on Facebook.” Id. at 386. 
The court reviewed what Facebook was, 59  who Facebook Users were and how they used 
																																																								
57  Bland, 857 F.Supp.2d 599, 603 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
58  In the very first sentence of her concurrence, the Honorable Ellen Lipton Hollander, sitting by designation on 
the Fourth Circuit panel in Bland, described Chief Judge Traxler’s opinion as “excellent.” 730 F.3d 368, 395 
(Hollander, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part on grounds entirely unrelated to the majority’s findings 
and holding with respect to online speech). 
59  “Facebook is ‘an online social network where members develop personalized web profiles to interact and share 
information with other members.’. Members can share various types of information, including ‘news headlines, 
photographs, videos, personal stories, and activity updates.’ Daily more than 500 million Facebook members 
use the site and more than three billion ‘likes’ and comments are posted.” 730 F.3d at 385 (internal cites 
omitted) (quoting Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir.2012)). 
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Facebook, 60  how Facebook Users had Profiles, how Users’ Profiles contained each User’s 
Likes,61 how Facebook itself defined a “Like,” and how Users used “likes.”62 In Bland, the 
Fourth Circuit recognized that when the sheriff’s employee visited a political campaign’s 
Facebook page (the “Campaign Page”) and clicked the “like” button on the Campaign Page, 
doing so caused information associated with the Campaign (the campaign page and a photo of 
the candidate)—which a campaign representative had selected as the Page’s icon—to be added 
to the employee user’s profile, which all Facebook users could view. On the employee user’s 
profile, the Campaign Page name served as a link to the Campaign Page. The employee user’s 
clicking on the “like” button also caused an announcement to appear in the news feeds of the 
employee user’s Facebook friends that the employee user liked the Campaign Page. And it 
caused the employee user’s name and profile photo to be added to the Campaign Page’s “People 
[Who] Like This” list. This is akin to how GiveForward’s electronic platform works. 
In determining that clicking a “like” button on Facebook is expressive speech because of 
the very nature and way that the Facebook software and platform functions, the Fourth Circuit’s 
holding defines and explains essential aspects of online speech and content on such social media 
and online platforms like GiveForward’s website. This holding has direct precedential bearing on 
GiveForward’s speech in this case. Chief Judge Traxler’s opinion is clear: 
																																																								
60  “When a user logs on to Facebook, his home page is the first thing that he typically sees. Included on a home 
page is a news feed, ‘which, for most Users, is the primary place where they see and interact with news and 
stories from and about their Friends and Pages they have connected with on Facebook.’” 730 F.3d at 385. 
61  “Every Facebook user has a profile, which ‘typically includes, among other things, the User’s name; photos the 
User has placed on the website (including one photo that serves as the User’s profile photo); a brief biographical 
sketch; a list of individual Facebook Users with whom the User [interacts, known as ‘friends’]; and...a list of 
Facebook ‘Pages’ the User has Liked.’ ‘[B]usinesses, organizations and brands,’ can also use “Pages” for 
similar purposes.” 730 F.3d at 385. (internal citations omitted). 
62  “‘Liking’ on Facebook is a way for Facebook users to share information with each other. The ‘like’ button, 
which is represented by a thumbs-up icon, and the word “like” appear next to different types of Facebook 
content. Liking something on Facebook ‘is an easy way to let someone know that you enjoy it.’ ‘When you 
connect to a Page, it will appear in your timeline and you will appear on the Page as a person who likes that 
Page. The Page will also be able to post content into your News Feed.’” 730 F.3d at 385 (internal citations 
omitted).	
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Once one understands the nature of what Carter [the sheriff’s office 
employee] did by liking the Campaign Page, it becomes apparent that his conduct 
qualifies as speech. On the most basic level, clicking on the “like” button literally 
causes to be published the statement that the User “likes” something, which is 
itself a substantive statement. In the context of a political campaign’s Facebook 
page, the meaning that the user approves of the candidacy whose page is being 
liked is unmistakable. That a user may use a single mouse click to produce that 
message that he likes the page instead of typing the same message with several 
individual key strokes is of no constitutional significance. 
Aside from the fact that liking the Campaign Page constituted pure speech, it 
also was symbolic expression. The distribution of the universally understood 
“thumbs up” symbol in association with Adams’s campaign page, like the actual 
text that liking the page produced, conveyed that Carter supported Adams’s 
candidacy. 
In sum, liking a political candidate’s campaign page communicates the user’s 
approval of the candidate and supports the campaign by associating the user with 
it. 
730 F.3d at 386 (citations omitted). 
As courts adapt and learn to apply speech and content concepts to activity and expression 
taking place via emerging technologies on more and more sophisticated online platforms for 
business and interaction, like the GiveForward website, even in the framework of CDA 
immunity, what is understood to be speech and content creation grows and evolves. For 
instances, courts have now recognized that impressions created by a website can constitute 
speech and content development for purposes of the CDA. See, e.g., Alvi Armani Med., Inc. v. 
Hennessey, 629 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1306-07 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. 
Xcentric Venture, LLC, 199 Fed. Appx. 738, 744 (11th Cir. 2006) (where complaint contained 
allegations illustrating defendants’ involvement in creating or developing the alleged defamatory 
content of consumer complaints posted on their website, district court erred in dismissing 
complaint)).  
Importantly, GiveForward’s CEO and Co-Founder, Desiree Vargas Wrigley, testified that 
she and others at GiveForward considered Facebook as a model for GiveForward’s online 
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platform with “similar” speech or as she described it “type of content” “being posted.”63 The 
complex GiveForward fundraising machinery is remarkably similar in ways to a campaign page 
on Facebook. For instance, GiveForward’s “hugs” “tips” and “emails” are directly analogous to 
Facebook “likes” in terms of expressive speech. For the KDH Fundraiser, GiveForward provided 
exemplar fundraiser language, 64  tips to increase fundraising content and results, automated 
emails, widgets, and human fundraising coaches. In the spring of 2013, when the KDH 
Fundraiser was launched, GiveForward’s website displayed specific, proposed, exemplar 
language for how a fundraiser should be worded.65 The tips publicly available on GiveForward’s 
website specifically recommend uploading a personal photo of the victim or fundraiser 
beneficiary, providing detailed information about the issue, and creating “a sense of urgency.” 
Johnson and Harris did exactly that, which resulted in the improper and privacy invading use of 
KDH’s name and photograph.  
Similar to a Facebook profile, GiveForward’s electronic systems automatically created a 
KDH Fundraiser profile that displayed KDH’s name and image. GiveForward’s systems 
automatically created a widget out of software code wholly created by GiveForward. 
GiveForward’s systems automatically enabled users and visitors to the KDH Fundraiser to “hug” 
the fundraiser, or to “like” the fundraiser (as on Facebook). And GiveForward’s machinery 
began to promote the fundraiser. This is documented by the “TweetBuzz” search results that 
depict the KDH Fundraiser as one of the most popular GiveForward Twitter stories. 
GiveForward’s fundraising coaches are specifically instructed to “hug” fundraisers, thereby 
																																																								
63  Wrigley testified, “We thought that in terms of the type of content that was being posted on -- on GiveForward 
by users, that it was very similar to the type of content that was being posted by users on Facebook, yeah.” 
Wrigley Dep. Tr. 24:14-20. 
64		 See	supra	at	10.	
65  McKeever Dep. Tr. Conveniently for GiveForward, however, GiveForward says it no longer has the sample 
language provided on its website at the time the KDH Fundraisers were launched, and thus has refused to 
produce any the exemplar language it provided at the time despite numerous requests. 
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promoting fundraiser awareness and providing the public with a sense of legitimacy of the 
“hugged” fundraisers.66 In other words, initial input of information on GiveForward’s website is 
not just a blank box that results in the original input appearing exactly as the organizer inserted 
it. First, GiveForward engages in activity that heavily shapes the content of the speech  
II. THE TORTIOUS CONTENT OR CONDUCT AT ISSUE IS NOT LIMITED TO 
THE FALSE CLAIM THAT KDH WAS DYING. 
KDH’s name and picture were posted on GiveForward’s website and multiple social 
media platforms, along with gut-wrenching lies about KDH’s health, for the purpose of preying 
on the generosity of unsuspecting donors. This fraudulent fundraising campaign was viewed on 
GiveForward’s own webpage a total of 1,523 times, was shared via Facebook 41 times, and 
received 54 individual donations. 67  In other words, KDH’s name and smiling face were 
associated with this appalling deceit at least 1,523 times on GiveForward’s own webpage and at 
least 41 times on Facebook. KDH had been used to fraudulently raise funds and his name and 
photo had been posted on the Internet for all to see. GiveForward mischaracterizes the tortious 
content at issue as limited solely to the false claim that KDH was sick.68 As Ms. Hodges and 
KDH have detailed extensively to this Court, the tortious content and conduct in the instant case 
go far beyond a simple lie that originated with Johnson. In helping to increase the success of the 
KDH Fundraiser, GiveForward increased the invasion of privacy and emotional distress. 
Everything that GiveForward did to increase the success of the KDH Fundraiser resulted in more 
people seeing the fundraiser, and the more people that saw the fundraiser, the greater the 
invasion of privacy. 
																																																								
66  Fundraising coaches who “hug” the most fundraisers receive a prize each month. 
67  Hodges Mot. ¶ 47.  
68  See, e.g., Mem at 16 (“[D]espite the Defendants’ attempt to characterize their claims as premised on something 
other than Mr. Johnson’s false statement that his son was sick, the claims at issue in this matter are undeniably 
based on this alleged offensive content.”).  
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GiveForward’s entire argument is premised on the concept that it did not create or develop 
the original false claim that KDH was sick. As illustrated by the following chart, GiveForward 
repeats this position so often in its Cross-Motion that it appears to be beating the Court over the 
head with it: 
GiveForward’s Mischaracterization of Tortious Content and Conduct At Issue Cite
69
“The Defendants now seeks to hold GiveForward responsible as if GiveForward was 
the publisher or speaker of Mr. Johnson’s false claim that his son was sick.” 
3 
Defendants “pursue GiveForward for a bevy of claims – all based on 
GiveForward’s publication of Mr. Johnson’s claim that his son had a terminal 
illness.” 
3 
“Defendants seek to impose liability on GiveForward as the publisher or speaker of 
content provided by a third party, Kimani Johnson-namely, the false claim that 
KDH was sick.” 
13 
“[T]he vast majority of Defendants’ claims center exclusively on Mr. Johnson’s 
false claim that KDH had a terminal heart condition.” 
14 
“[E]ach of these claims treats GiveForward as the publisher or speaker of Mr. 
Johnson’s false claim that his son was sick.” 
15 
“[D]espite the Defendants’ attempt to characterize their claims as premised on 
something other than Mr. Johnson's false statement that his son was sick.” 
15-16 
“[T]he claims asserted under the [Maryland Solicitation Act] are dependent on 
treating GiveForward as the publisher or speaker of the claim that KDH had a 
terminal illness.” 
16 
“[A]ll of the alleged violations of [the Maryland Solicitation Act] require 
GiveForward to be treated as the publisher or speaker of Mr. Johnson’s claim that 
KDH had a terminal illness.” 
18 
“Defendants do not point to any analogous Maryland law that would create a duty 
independent from the claims based on GiveForward's publication of Mr. Johnson’s 
fraudulent claim that his son was sick.” 
19 
“[T]he CDA shields GiveForward from liability premised on treating it as the 
publisher or speaker of Mr. Johnson's false statements.” 
22 
“[E]ach of the Defendants' fraud-based claims is based solely on treating 
GiveForward as the publisher or speaker of Mr. Johnson's claim that KDH had a 
terminal illness.” 
29 
“GiveForward Is Not An Information Content Provider For The Alleged Tortious 




“Mr. Johnson Provided All Of The Allegedly Tortious Content At Issue – The 
Fraudulent Claim That KDH Was Sick.”  
31 
(title) 
“Because the Defendants have no basis to argue that GiveForward created Mr. 
Johnson's false claim, the Defendants are, instead, left to attempt to argue that 
32 
																																																								
69  These citations are to page locations in GiveForward’s Memorandum.  
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GiveForward “developed” Mr. Johnson’s claim.” 
“Defendants  do not provide evidence of any practice by GiveForward that materially 
contributed to the false claim that KDH was sick.” 
35 
“Defendants must produce evidence that demonstrates that GiveForward materially 
contributed to the false claim that KDH had a terminal illness – the alleged 
offensive content at issue in this case.” 
35 
“GiveForward cannot be held liable as an information content provider for 
‘development’ of the false claim that KDH was sick.” 
35 
“Defendants must establish a business practice that materially contributes to illegal 
content and, in this case, the fraudulent claim that KDH was sick.” 
38 
“None Of The Alleged Business Practices Identified By The Defendants 
Materially…Contributed To The Claim That KDH Had A Terminal Illness.”  
39 
(title) 
“Defendants do not even attempt to explain how this Tweet allegedly contributed to the 
false claim that KDH was sick.” 
39 
“Defendants…do not explain how allowing users to share a fundraiser… materially… 
contributed to the claim that KDH had a terminal illness.” 
40 
“Defendants fail to explain how…[widgets] contributed to the claim that KDH had a 
terminal illness.” 
40 
“Neither the Tweet, thank you message nor the widget…materially contributed to Mr. 
Johnson’s false claim.” 
41 
“[N]one of these things makes GiveForward an information content provider of the 
offensive content at issue in this case – the claim that KDH was sick.” 
41 
“Defendants…fail to identify…anything associated with GiveForward’s lawful 
fundraising that … contributed to the claim that KDH was sick.” 
41 
“Defendants fail to identify anything done by GiveForward that allegedly 
contributed to the fraudulent claim that KDH was sick.” 
41 
“Defendants fail to explain how having customer service or “support” for the 
GiveForward website allegedly… contributed to the false claim that KDH was sick.”  
43-44 
“Defendants do not explain how allowing users to share a fundraiser… in any way 
materially contributes to … the claim that KDH had a terminal illness.” 
45 
“Defendants do not explain how featuring fundraisers on its website materially 
contributed to the claim that KDH was sick.” 
46 
“[N]one of these [tips and suggestions sent directly to Johnson and Harris] could have 
materially contributed to the false claim that KDH was sick.”  
46 
“Defendants’ [sic] fail to explain how any of the actions that they speculate Johnson 
and Harris took (e.g., making an initial donation, sharing the fundraiser with 
friends, enabling PayPal, etc.) … materially contributed to the false claim that 
KDH had a terminal illness.”  
46 
“All of the claims that form the basis of GiveForward’s complaint are based on the 
Defendants seeking to hold GiveForward liable as the publisher or speaker of Mr. 
Johnson’s false claim that his son was sick.”  
50 
 
In its Cross-Motion, GiveForward provides small charts that misleadingly describe Ms. 
Hodges and KDH’s claims, despite the fact that such an unreasonably narrow characterization is 
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directly contradictory to Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Counterclaims and subsequent pleadings and 
has no basis in fact, law, or logic. GiveForward falsely asserts that “the vast majority of 
Defendants’ claims center exclusively on Mr. Johnson’s false claim that KDH had a terminal 
heart condition.” 70  (emphasis added). As detailed above, Defendants’ claims center on a 
multitude of tortious conduct and content related to the use of KDH’s name and likeness to 
fraudulently solicit donations and GiveForward’s misleading business practices. GiveForward’s 
repeated assertions to the contrary intentionally mislead this Court and reflect a profound 
misunderstanding of the law. 
GiveForward’s belief that causes of action for invasion of privacy could center exclusively 
on a simple lie suggests unfamiliarity with the basic elements of Maryland tort law. 
GiveForward’s exclusive fixation on the false statement might be justified in the face of a 
defamation claim, wherein a false statement is the primary basis for liability. However, invasion 
of privacy claims are not premised merely on a false statement, but rather the widespread 
dissemination of private information. Ms. Hodges and KDH do not assert that GiveForward 
defamed KDH with the false claim that he was sick; rather, Ms. Hodges and KDH assert that the 
widespread dissemination of this false claim accompanied by KDH’s name and likeness is the 
tortious content and conduct at issue.  
GiveForward further distorts Ms. Hodges and KDH’s arguments regarding GiveForward’s 
role as an information content provider, falsely representing to the Court that Ms. Hodges and 
KDH seek to prove that GiveForward created and developed Johnson’s false claim that KDH 
was dying.71 Again, this false claim is not the only tortious content or conduct at issue, nor even 
																																																								
70  GF Mem. at 14. GiveForward’s chart purporting to summarize Ms. Hodges and KDH’s allegations contains 
select excerpts from the Counterclaims that reference the false claim about KDH’s health, while conveniently 
failing to include the complete basis for the causes of action. See GF Mem. at 14-15.  
71  See GF Mem. at 32 (“Because the Defendants have no basis to argue that GiveForward created Mr. Johnson’s 
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is it the primary basis for GiveForward’s liability as asserted by Ms. Hodges and KDH.. 
GiveForward independently created and developed content that invaded KDH’s privacy and used 
KDH as a prop for fraudulent fundraising. GiveForward failed to exercise reasonable due care 
and due diligence. GiveForward failed to heed its own protocol and warnings of potential fraud. 
GiveForward misstates the significance of the GiveForward-generated content at issue, 
again arguing that this content did not contribute to the lie that KDH was sick and therefore is 
not actionable. The GiveForward-generated content is, in fact, actionable. Consider, for example, 
the Tweet by Ashley Groves promoting the KDH fundraiser.72 The Tweet included a photo of 
KDH and his name, which Ms. Hodges and KDH have already explained is an invasion of 
KDH’s privacy.73 GiveForward states that Ms. Hodges and KDH “do not even attempt to explain 
how this Tweet allegedly contributed to the false claim that KDH was sick.”74 Ms. Hodges and 
KDH do not argue that this Tweet contributed to Johnson’s lie, nor do they need to. The Tweet 
itself is an invasion of KDH’s privacy and it furthered other invasions of KDH’s privacy by 
increasing the dissemination and success of the fraudulent KDH Fundraiser. The following chart 
identifies just some of the KDH Fundraiser content that GiveForward created and/or developed 
and partially explains its tortious character:75 
Tortious Content and Conduct Created 
and/or Developed by GiveForward 
Tortious Character of this Content and 
Conduct 
Tweet by Ashley Groves promoting KDH 
fundraiser 
Direct invasion of privacy and emotional 
distress via disclosure of KDH’s name, as well 
as promotion of the KDH Fundraiser 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
false claim, the Defendants are, instead, left to attempt to argue that GiveForward ‘developed’ Mr. Johnson’s 
claim.”). 
72  GiveForward curiously claims that Ms. Hodges and KDH do not contend this Tweet is actionable. GF Mem. at 
39. This is false. 
73  See Defs.’ Ans. to Interrogs. at 6. 
74  GF Mem. at 39.  
75  This chart is not intended to be an exhaustive list of GiveForward created content or an exhaustive analysis of 
all tortious aspects of GiveForward’s conduct. 
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Widgets Direct invasion of privacy and emotional 
distress via disclosure of KDH’s name and 
likeness, as well as promotion of the KDH 
Fundraiser. 
Thank You Emails from GiveForward to 
donors and supporters 
Invasion of privacy and emotional distress via 
promotion of the KDH’s fundraiser 
Fundraising Tip Emails; Fundraising Advice 
Resources; Fundraiser Coaching 
Furthered the dissemination, publicity, and 
financial success of the KDH Fundraiser, 
thereby increasing invasion of privacy and 
emotional distress.  
Affirmative Representations regarding safety 
of GiveForward fundraisers 
Created the impression that fundraisers had 
been vetted, which increased donor confidence 
and furthered the dissemination, publicity, and 
financial success of the KDH Fundraiser, 
thereby increasing invasions of privacy and 
emotional distress.  
 
GiveForward concludes its argument by repeating its glib mischaracterization of the 
tortious content and conduct at issue in this case: “All of the claims that form the basis of 
GiveForward’s Complaint are based on the Defendants seeking to hold GiveForward liable as 
the publisher or speaker of Mr. Johnson’s false claim that his son was sick.”76 After suing Ms. 
Hodges and then-8-year-old KDH, GiveForward now seeks to determine unilaterally what 
content and conduct Ms. Hodges and KDH take issue with and to rewrite the contents of their 
pleadings. GiveForward’s cavalier assertions about the facts and pleadings of this case 
demonstrate its stunning disregard of the rules of this Court and the truth.  
III. GIVEFORWARD IS AN INFORMATION CONTENT PROVIDER IN GENERAL 
AND FOR THE KDH FUNDRAISER IN PARTICULAR. 
Pursuant to the statutory language of the CDA, an “information content provider” is “any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(f)(3) (emphasis added). Despite GiveForward’s arguments to the contrary, upon review of 
the facts, it is clear that in supplementing the content of and creating new content for the KDH 
																																																								
76  GF Mem. at 50. 
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Fundraiser (e.g., GiveForward’s Tweet and widget promoting the fraudulent fundraiser, emails to 
Johnson and Harris, and emails to donors), GiveForward itself created and developed 
information for the KDH Fundraiser. It is also clear that by providing significant substantive tips 
and advice designed to maximize donations and GiveForward’s profits therefrom, GiveForward 
is a co-developer of content. Ultimately, because GiveForward is an information content 
provider, it loses CDA immunity and, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment. 
A. GiveForward Mischaracterizes and Misapplies CDA Caselaw. 
GiveForward, in support of its argument that it is not an information content provider 
“for the alleged tortious content at issue,”77 primarily relies on three cases: Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. 
v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009); Fair Housing Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); and Jones v. Dirty 
World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014). Not only is each of these 
cases distinguishable, but GiveForward frequently misapplies the law culled from these cases in 
arguing that it is not an information content provider.78 For example, GiveForward misconstrues 
what it means to “develop” content and limits “development” to “material contribution.”79 
However, as explicitly stated by the Fourth Circuit in Nemet, the “material contribution” 
definition is only one definition of “development.” See 591 F.3d at 257. Not only are there other 
definitions of “development,” but a party is an information content provider if it develops or 
creates content. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Accordingly, there are multiple bases upon which a 
website can lose CDA immunity. 
																																																								
77  See supra at section II for a discussion of how GiveForward has myopically and illogically limited the “tortious 
content at issue” to Johnson’s initial lie that KDH was dying. 
78  Additionally, as discussed supra, it is important to keep in mind that GiveForward’s mischaracterization of the 
tortious conduct at issue here has necessarily impacted and infected GiveForward’s ability to properly address 
the caselaw. 
79  See, e.g., GF Mem. at 31 (“…it is not sufficient to show that an interactive computer service contributed just 
any content. Instead, the website must be shown to have materially contributed to the content that allegedly 
gives rise to tort liability.” (emphasis in original)). 
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Nemet—With regard to Nemet, GiveForward writes specifically (and in relevant part): 
The Fourth Circuit followed the material contribution definition of 
“development” in Nemet…. In Nemet the plaintiff argued that the website—which 
was designed to post consumer complaints—should be liable for developing 
content because of the “structure and design of its website” and because it 
“solicit[ed] its customers’ complaints [and] steered them into specific categories.” 
The court, however, upheld the dismissal of the complaint, because even 
accepting these allegations as true, there was no evidence that the website 
“contributed to the allegedly fraudulent nature of the comments at issue.” 
In Nemet,…the plaintiff claimed that the website contacted “the consumer to 
ask questions about the complaint and to help her draft or revise her complaint. 
The Fourth Circuit found that these allegations were insufficient to remove § 230 
immunity….” 
Mem. at 33 (emphasis omitted). However, GiveForward entirely misconstrues Nemet, which 
addresses whether a Virginia U.S. District Court properly granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Nemet court held “that these allegations were insufficient 
to remove § 230 immunity” precisely because the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts 
regarding the particular questions the website contacted the consumer to ask. Therefore, the 
complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  
Importantly, in Nemet, the Fourth Circuit was considering whether the plaintiff had 
alleged facts sufficient to support the causes of action asserted in the complaint, and ultimately 
determined that it had not. This issue has already been litigated before the Court in relation to 
GiveForward’s Combined Motion to Dismiss and For Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF 23]. And 
this Court has already ruled that Ms. Hodges and KDH pleaded sufficient facts such that the 
parties in this case were ordered to proceed with discovery. See Nov. 22, 2013 Order [ECF 30]. 
Unlike the plaintiff in Nemet, who had failed to plead – as a preliminary matter – sufficient 
factual allegations, this Court has already found that Ms. Hodges and KDH did allege sufficient 
factual allegations to survive GiveForward’s motion to dismiss and move forward with 
discovery. 
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Additionally, though the Fourth Circuit in Nemet did adopt the material contribution 
definition of “development” from Roommates, the Fourth Circuit did not limit “development” to 
merely that one definition. The Nemet court explicitly states that “Roommates.com merely 
adopted a definition of ‘development,’ for purposes of § 230(f)(3), that includes ‘materially 
contributing’ to a given piece of information’s ‘alleged unlawfulness.’” Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 
(emphasis added). Thus, in the Fourth Circuit, “material contribution” is not the exclusive 
definition of development under the CDA. 
Nemet is also factually inapposite. The defendant in Nemet provided an online consumer 
complaint bulletin board to which third-party users posted their complaints. The plaintiff filed a 
claim against the defendant alleging defamation because of complaints posted to the bulletin 
board by third-parties users. By comparison, GiveForward is a for-profit fundraising consulting 
service that provides tips and advice to third-party users regarding how to maximize donations 
(and by extension, increase GiveForward’s profits). Importantly, GiveForward also 
independently creates content (e.g., widgets) designed to extend the reach of fundraisers. This 
independently created content is speech that directly impacted the extent to which KDH’s 
privacy was invaded. 
Roommates and Jones—GiveForward primarily relies on Roommates and Jones in 
support of its argument that GiveForward is not an information content provider because it did 
not materially contribute to the alleged unlawfulness of the tortious conduct or content.80 In 
Roommates, the Ninth Circuit did hold that a definition of “development” of information is to 
“materially contribut[e]to the alleged unlawfulness” of the conduct. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 
1167-68. Likewise, in Jones, the Sixth Circuit adopted this “material contribution” definition of 
“development” and rejected the Kentucky District Court’s “encouragement test of immunity” 
																																																								
80  See GF Mem. at 32-33, 34-35. 
Case 1:13-cv-01891-JFM   Document 128   Filed 03/26/15   Page 31 of 54
29 
and “adoption or ratification theory.” See Jones, 755 F.3d at 413-15. However, as noted by the 
Fourth Circuit’s controlling decision in Nemet, “material contribution” is merely one definition 
of “development” among many. See Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257. 
In discussing Jones, GiveForward curiously ignores the Sixth Circuit’s most important 
statements and recognition of the law surrounding “development” and publication of speech and 
content on the Internet: 
By contrast, an overly exclusive interpretation of “development” would 
exclude all the publishing, editorial, and screening functions of a website operator 
from the set of actions that the term denotes. Some courts have implied this 
interpretation, however. See, e.g., Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F.Supp.2d 719, 727 
(N.D.Ohio 2007), af’d, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.2008). But we have refused to adopt 
it. See Doe, 551 F.3d at 415 (“[W]e do not reach the question of whether the 
[CDA] provides SexSearch with immunity from suit. We do not adopt the district 
court’s discussion of the Act, which would read § 230 more broadly than any 
previous Court of Appeals decision has read it, potentially abrogating all state- or 
common-law causes of action brought against interactive Internet services.”). We 
have maintained that, despite the CDA, some state tort claims will lie against 
website operators acting in their publishing, editorial, or screening capacities. 
755 F.3d at 409-410. (emphasis added). In Jones, the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected any 
definition of “development” for purposes of CDA immunity in such a way as to be “potentially 
abrogating all state- or common-law causes of action brought against interactive Internet 
services.” 755 F.3d at 410. But that is precisely what GiveForward is asking this court to do. 
Under GiveForward’s theory, there would be no circumstance where it could be found liable 
because it never starts any fundraiser without first being approached by third-party, and it is 
always the third-party organizer who brings the initial story to GiveForward’s systems. By 
GiveForward’s interpretation no amount of privacy invasion, no amount of negligence, no failure 
of due diligence, no failure to comply with any state’s professional fundraising laws (and 
Maryland’s in particular), and no amount of subsequent speech by GiveForward would ever 
abrogate the CDA’s shield of immunity. 
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Contrary to GiveForward’s assertions, these cases do not foreclose Ms. Hodges and 
KDH’s Counterclaims. As the Jones court points out, it is an issue of how inclusively or 
exclusively a court reads the statutory term “development.” See Jones, 755 F.3d at 409-10. An 
overly inclusive interpretation of “development” would posit that a website operator is 
responsible for the development of content created by a third party merely by displaying or 
allowing access to it. Id. at 409. By contrast, an overly exclusive interpretation of “development” 
would exclude all the publishing, editorial, and screening functions of a website operator from 
the set of actions that the term denotes. Id. The Jones court rejects both of these interpretations 
of “development,” stating on the one hand, the “recognition that the CDA affords immunity 
forecloses this overbroad reading of ‘development,’” id., and stating on the other hand, “despite 
the CDA, some state tort claims will lie against website operators acting in their publishing, 
editorial, or screening capacities. […] And instances of development may include some functions 
a website operator may conduct with respect to content originating from a third party.” 755 F.3d 
at 410. 
Additionally, as the Roommates court points out, by enacting section 230 of the CDA, 
“Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content not the creation of 
content,” 521 F.3d at 1163 (emphasis in original), and “the substance of section 230(c) can and 
should be interpreted consistent with its caption,” id. at 1164. Further, Roommates explicitly 
recognized that there are multiple bases for loss of immunity as an information content provider, 
specifically stating, “section 230(c) uses both ‘create’ and ‘develop’ as separate bases for loss of 
immunity.” Id. at 1168. Ultimately, however, GiveForward devotes altogether too much of its 
Cross-Motion to discussing Roommates, a Ninth Circuit case, and Jones, a Sixth Circuit case, 
neither of which is controlling law but only persuasive and/or instructive. 
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Finally, one thing that Nemet and Jones have in common is that they are both factually 
inapposite. Nemet and Jones involved claims of defamation. Thus, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
in these cases found that in order to lose its CDA immunity, the websites at issue had to 
materially contribute to the actionable speech (i.e., the defamatory speech). GiveForward seizes 
on certain language from the Jones decision to support the argument that it did not contribute to 
the actionable speech (i.e., the false claim that KDH was dying).81 However, as discussed in 
Section II above and more fully below, Ms. Hodges and KDH have not alleged that GiveForward 
is liable for Johnson’s initial lie, but rather that GiveForward itself committed other conduct that 
is either directly actionable itself or materially contributed to the actionable invasions of KDH’s 
privacy, etc. Notably, Ms. Hodges and KDH have not asserted a claim of defamation against 
GiveForward, so Nemet and Jones are wholly inapposite. 
B. GiveForward Created and/or Developed Fundraiser Content. 
Without fully rehashing the substance of Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Motion, it is important 
briefly to revisit the facts that show GiveForward is an “information content provider.” 
GiveForward independently creates content for fundraising campaigns. Through its Twitter feed 
and donor thank you emails, GiveForward alone provides information regarding the fundraisers 
on its website. GiveForward’s Tweets (including the Tweet about the KDH Fundraiser), are 
initiated, created, and drafted entirely by a GiveForward employee. The donor emails are 
similarly created, drafted, and sent entirely by GiveForward. Users of the online fundraising 
platform have absolutely no involvement in the creation and distribution of GiveForward’s social 
media and email messages on behalf of a fundraiser. These materials are GiveForward’s 
independent speech and directly invaded KDH’s privacy for financial gain. 
																																																								
81  See GF Mem. at 38 (“The Jones court concluded that ‘[a] website operator cannot be responsible for what 
makes another party’s statement actionable by commenting on that statement post hoc.’”) 
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GiveForward’s independently created widgets also make GiveForward an information 
content provider. As described in Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Motion, these widgets allow 
fundraiser visitors to post a GiveForward-created snapshot of the fundraiser to an external, third-
party website. In creating each widget, GiveForward solely develops the software used by the 
widget, GiveForward rearranges the fundraiser title, description, and photograph, and 
GiveForward then adds a “progress arc” detailing the progress of the fundraiser towards the 
fundraising goal. Users are not able to alter GiveForward’s widgets in any way. GiveForward’s 
technology transforms the words, photographs, and actions associated with a fundraiser into an 
entirely different piece of content that then is placed externally to direct traffic to a particular 
fundraiser. Through its widgets, GiveForward and a fundraiser organizer work together to 
maximize fundraiser donations and profits to GiveForward. GiveForward’s widgets for the KDH 
Fundraiser sent 212 people to the KDH Fundraiser webpage. 
GiveForward is also responsible for the ongoing development of new fundraiser content 
because it prompts fundraiser organizers to modify and supplement the initial content of their 
fundraisers through the multitude of fundraising tips, suggestion emails, and personalized 
suggestions that it provides. In this case, a few days after receiving an email suggesting that they 
make an update to the KDH Fundraiser, Johnson and Harris did, in fact, make an update to the 
KDH Fundraiser claiming that KDH’s alleged impending surgery had to be pushed up.82 
GiveForward further develops content during the creation of a fundraiser by providing 
the organizer with suggested language and detailed instructions on how to write a compelling 
story.83 GiveForward also develops content by encouraging users to follow specific content-
																																																								
82  See Hodges Mot. at 21, ¶ 55. 
83  Notably, Mr. McKeever testified that in the spring of 2013 GiveForward’s website contained sample fundraiser 
content designed to guide fundraiser organizers while during the fundraiser creation process. See McKeever 
Dep. Tr. 81:6-20. This statement directly contradicts Ms. Alhorn’s affidavit submitted by GiveForward in 
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related instructions provided in fundraising tip emails and fundraising guides. For example, 
GiveForward instructs users as to (i) how many photographs a fundraiser should feature; 
(ii) what kinds of scenes or activities photographs should depict; (iii) how many updates a user 
should make to their fundraiser; (iv) what kind of events or personal thoughts fundraiser updates 
should include; (v) how to create a “sense of urgency”84 to increase fundraising momentum; and 
(vi) how to set an example by making the first donation in an amount the user wants others to 
contribute. GiveForward provides all of this information with the ultimate goal of maximizing 
donations to each and every fundraiser and, thereby, increasing its own profits. Maximizing 
donations results in the fundraiser reaching more and more donors, thereby increasing the 
invasion to KDH’s privacy with each new donation. This goes far beyond the “traditional 
editorial functions” that Congress intended to immunize with the CDA. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 
330.85 
IV. GIVEFORWARD HAS A LEGAL DUTY AS A PROFESSIONAL FUNDRAISER. 
A. The State has a Significant Interest in Regulating Fundraising and Such 
Regulation is Consistent With the CDA. 
As Ms. Hodges and KDH addressed extensively in the Hodges Motion,86 courts have 
specifically recognized the States’ rights and substantial interest in preventing fraudulent 
fundraising.87 GiveForward, however, entirely missed the point of this discussion, arguing that 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
support of its Cross-Motion. Importantly, GiveForward is telling this Court to trust Ms. Alhorn’s statements 
(which are mainly legal conclusions) despite the contradictory nature of Mr. McKeever’s deposition testimony 
and the fact that neither Ms. Hodges and KDH nor the Court can examine GiveForward’s website circa spring 
2013 because that information is no longer available because GiveForward failed to preserve it. 
84  Considering that during his deposition Johnson used the precise phrase, “sense of urgency,” multiple times, he 
obviously received and read GiveForward’s email tips. See Johnson Dep. Tr. 76:4, 7, 14, 18. 
85  “[D]eciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content” are examples of “a publisher’s traditional 
editorial functions.” 
86  See Hodges Mot. at 43-44. 
87  See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 100 S. Ct. 826, 833-34, 63 L. 
Ed. 2d 73 (1980) (“Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation.”); Riley v. Nat’l 
Fed’n of the Blind of N.C, 487 U.S. 781, 814, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (“The modern state owes 
and attempts to perform a duty to protect the public from those who seek for one purpose or another to obtain its 
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the type of fundraising in this line of cases is not analogous to GiveForward’s fundraising.88 Ms. 
Hodges and KDH are not analogizing the fraudulent fundraising in these cases to the fraudulent 
fundraising at issue here. Rather, this line of cases confirms that courts universally recognize a 
state’s right to regulate professional fundraising to deter fundraising fraud. 
Protecting its citizens from fraud is well within a state’s police powers. See Melissa G. 
Liazos, Can States Impose Registration Requirements on Online Charitable Solicitors?, 67 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1379, 1400 (2000).89 This significant state interest in protecting against fraudulent 
fundraising does not change merely because such fundraising takes place online. See id. at 
1399.90 However, GiveForward is asking this Court to hold that the CDA trumps States’ ability 
to protect its citizens from fraudulent fundraising simply because GiveForward conducts its 
fundraising business online. The CDA does not prevent laws that regulate brick-and-mortar 
business activity from regulating the same activities if conducted in cyberspace. Something that 
is unlawful offline – for example, fraud in fundraisers and invasion of privacy – does not 
“magically become lawful when [moved] online.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164. 
B. The Maryland Solicitations Act Applies to GiveForward. 
The Maryland Solicitations Act (“MSA”) regulates individuals acting as “fund-raising 
counsel,” “professional solicitor,” or “charitable representative” and prohibits the use of false or 
misleading statements or conduct in connection with charitable solicitations. See generally Md. 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
money. When one does so through the practice of a calling, the state may have an interest in shielding the public 
against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible, or against unauthorized representation of 
agency.”); Ctr. for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Athey, 866 F. Supp. 237, 240 (D. Md. 1993) aff'd, 37 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 
1994) (“The substantial state interest in this case is protecting the public from fraud by regulating the charities 
that solicit it for funds.”). 
88  See GF Mem. at 19-22 (“The Defendants next try to extrapolate ‘certain duties to the public’ owed by ‘persons 
engaged in fundraising’ from several cases allegedly involving solicitation of donations.”) 
89  “It is a well established principle that state police powers encompass the protection of citizens from fraud. There 
is no general federal police power.” 
90  “States’ concerns about fraud being perpetrated against their citizens are no less legitimate in the Internet 
context than in real space. Such concerns may be even greater online given the low start-up costs and the broad 
audience that a solicitation may reach.” 
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Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 6-101, et seq. The MSA draws no distinction between traditional, brick-
and-mortar charitable solicitations and those conducted online, see id, and applies with equal 
force to GiveForward as it does to Goodwill Industries or National Association of Police 
Organizations.  
Under the MSA, GiveForward is a fund-raising counsel,91 professional solicitor,92 and 
charitable representative 93  because it received payment to “hold[], plan[], or manage[]” 
charitable solicitations in Maryland.94 A “charitable solicitation” is an “oral or written request for 
a charitable contribution.” MSA § 6-101(f)(1). Charitable solicitations specifically include “a 
fund-raising drive, event, campaign, or other activity.” Id. § 6-101(f)(2)(i). A “charitable 
contribution” is one made on the representation that the contribution will be used for a 
“charitable purpose,” id. § 6-101(c)(1), which specifically means “any charitable, benevolent, 
philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynary purpose for religion, health, education, social welfare, 
arts and humanities, and civic and public interests.” Md. Code Regs. 01.02.04.01.G.  
GiveForward earns money (i.e., receives payment) from the percentage of funds raised 
that it retains (7% for the KDH Fundraiser), and it “holds, plans, or manages” fundraisers by 
																																																								
91  “’Fund-raising counsel’ means a person who, for pay: 
(i) advises a charitable organization about a charitable solicitation in Maryland or holds, plans, or manages 
a charitable solicitation in Maryland; but 
(ii) does not directly solicit or receive charitable contributions from the public. 
Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 6-101(h)(1) (emphasis added). 
92  “Professional solicitor” means a person who, for pay: 
(i) advises a charitable organization about a charitable solicitation; 
(ii) holds, plans, or manages a charitable solicitation; or 
(iii) solicits or receives charitable contributions for a charitable organization, personally or through an 
associate solicitor. 
Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 6-101(i)(1) (emphasis added). 
93  “‘Charitable representative’ means a professional solicitor, associate solicitor, or fund-raising counsel.” Md. 
Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 6-101(e).  
94  GiveForward’s argument that the MSA does not apply to it because it is not a charitable representative misstates 
the law. See GF Mem. at 17-18 n. 3. Nowhere does the MSA state that a fund-raising counsel or professional 
solicitor must work for a charitable organization; GiveForward’s statement that this is a requirement, see id, is 
simply false. GiveForward “holds, plans, or manages” fundraisers that qualify as “charitable solicitations” 
pursuant to § 6-101(f). Thus, GiveForward is a fund-raising counsel and professional solicitor and, therefore, a 
charitable representative. See § 6-101(e), (h), (i).  
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hosting fundraisers and providing fundraising advice and promotional materials.95 GiveForward 
describes itself as “the #1 platform to start a medical fundraiser and the only site with 
fundraising coaches who provide fundraising ideas and guidance on how to raise money 
online.” 96  The majority of fundraisers on GiveForward’s website qualify as “charitable 
solicitations” because they are requests for financial help for a benevolent purpose—health 
interests in the case of the KDH Fundraiser. Indeed, GiveForward’s stated purpose is to assist 
fundraisers to send “financial support to patients navigating a medical crisis,” Md. Code Regs. 
01.02.04.01.G . 
The MSA explicitly prohibits charitable representatives, like GiveForward, from 
engaging in false or misleading fundraising activities. See MSA § 6-608(a).97 The MSA further 
makes it clear that this prohibition is violated “whether or not a person has been misled, 
deceived, or damaged.” Id. § 6-608(b) (emphasis added). While acting as a charitable 
representative, GiveForward engaged in numerous misleading acts and practices regarding the 
legitimacy of the fundraisers it supports by: 
 claiming on its website that using its GiveForward is “quick, easy, and secure,”98  
 telling visitors to their website that there’s “no need to worry when creating or 
giving to a fundraiser,”99  
 informing CNN Money that “GiveForward assigns a live ‘fundraising coach’ to 
each campaign, who both vets and guides the efforts,”100 and 
 claiming on its online support center that “GiveForward makes every effort to 
investigate suspect fundraisers…[and] has a due diligence process.”101   
																																																								
95  See § 6-101(h), (i). 
96  http://www.giveforward.com, visited March 23, 2015.  
97  “In connection with a charitable solicitation, a charitable organization or charitable representative may not 
commit an act or engage in a practice that by affirmative representation or by omission is misleading about 
anything important to, or likely to affect, another person’s decision to make a charitable contribution.” 
98  http://www.giveforward.com/p/about-us, last visited Mar. 26, 2015 (emphasis added). 
99  Id. (emphasis added).  
100  http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/19/pf/crowdfunding-boston-victims/, last visited Mar. 26, 2015 (emphasis 
added). 
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These misleading acts and practices regarding the safety and legitimacy of the fundraisers on 
GiveForward’s website increased donor confidence in the fundraisers it hosted,102 facilitating in 
turn the widespread dissemination of the fraudulent KDH Fundraiser and thereby increasing the 
gross invasions of KDH’s privacy. GiveForward itself recognizes the importance of donor 
confidence.103 
The MSA also prohibits any “person” from using “false or materially misleading 
advertising or promotional material in connection with a charitable solicitation.” MSA § 6-607. 
Maryland regulations define these proscribed acts as “any false or misleading oral or written 
statement or other representation which has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or 
misleading the person solicited.” Md. Code Regs. 01.02.04.19.G. The MSA’s prohibition on 
misleading advertising, promotion, and statements applies to GiveForward’s conduct, regardless 
of whether it is a fund-raising counsel, professional solicitor, or charitable representative.104 
GiveForward’s affirmative misleading statements regarding the safety of its website and the 
legitimacy of GiveForward fundraisers make donors think that GiveForward has, in fact, 
exercised due diligence to ensure that fundraisers are legitimate. The false sense of security 
GiveForward creates via these misleading statements facilitated the widespread dissemination 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
101  Hodges Mot., Ex. A at GF_Hodges0000002 (emphasis added). 
102  The Fourth Circuit has recognized that fundraising efforts benefit from increased donor confidence. See Ctr. for 
Auto Safety Inc. v. Athey, 37 F.3d 139, fn 9 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he level of charitable giving will tend to 
increase, as citizens are more likely to donate to charities that have been investigated and found to be 
reputable.”).  
103  See Hodges Mot. at 23-24, ¶ 63 (quoting Erica Alhorn, GiveForward’s Director of User Relations and 
Fundraising Coach, regarding the importance of donor confidence). 
104  Though the MSA grants immunity to publishers of charitable solicitations, see MSA § 6-621, such immunity 
does not apply to GiveForward because it is a fund-raising counsel, professional solicitor, and/or charitable 
representative under the statute. The Maryland legislature, by including publisher immunity, clearly intended to 
distinguish an entity that “holds, plans, or manages” a fundraiser from an entity that merely publishes 
fundraisers. GiveForward “holds, plans, or manages” fundraisers and is precisely the type of business that the 
MSA is designed to regulate.  
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and financial success of the KDH Fundraiser, which thereby increased the invasions of KDH’s 
privacy and the emotional distress he has experienced as a result. 
C. GiveForward’s Violation of the MD Solicitations Act Gives Rise to a Private 
Cause of Action and is Proof of GiveForward’s Negligence. 
1. GiveForward’s arguments are belied by the plain language of the MSA. 
GiveForward mistakenly argues that because the MSA authorizes the Secretary of State 
and Attorney General to investigate violations of the Act, this grant of authority is exclusive and 
intended to prevent private causes of action.105 However, the plain language of the statute states 
that these officials may investigate violations. See § 6-205(a)(1).106 The statue expressly uses the 
word “may” to indicate that it is permissive (not mandatory) and to clarify that it is not the 
exclusive means of enforcement. Nowhere in the MSA does the legislature express any intention 
to preclude victims of fraudulent fundraising from seeking remedy from the violators. Maryland 
courts have long recognized that “if a statute fixing a penalty for an offence, does not either 
expressly or by necessary implication, cut off the common law prosecution or punishment for the 
same offence, it shall be taken to intend merely a cumulative remedy.” Pres., Mgrs. & Co. of 
Washington & Baltimore Tpk. Rd. v. State, 19 Md. 239, 239 (1862), aff'd sub nom Washington & 
Baltimore Tpk. Co. v. State, 70 U.S. 210 (1865) (citing New York Supreme Court). 107 
Furthermore, Ms. Hodges and KDH are not seeking to enforce the provisions of the MSA; rather, 
they are seeking remedy for injuries they sustained through actions long recognized at common 
law and pursuant to the policies of law promoted by the MSA. 
																																																								
105  See GF Mem. at 16. 
106  “The Secretary of State or the Attorney General may investigate an alleged violation of this title.” (emphasis 
added). 
107  See also Rosin v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 89 A.D. 245, 248, 86 N.Y.S. 49, 52 (App. Div. 1903) (internal citations 
omitted): 
[W]here a remedy existed at the common law for a wrong or injury against which a remedial statute is 
directed, if such statute provides a more enlarged or summary or more efficient remedy for the party 
aggrieved, but does not in terms or by necessary implication deprive him of the remedy which existed 
at common law, the statutory remedy is considered as merely cumulative, and the party injured may 
resort to either at his election. This doctrine is old as the common law. 
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2. Even if there were not a common law cause of action already in 
existence, there is an implied private right of action here. 
The MSA does not include an explicit private cause of action for individuals harmed by 
violations of the Act. However, Maryland regularly recognizes an implied private right of action 
in statutes that meet the three factors laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66 (1975). See, e.g., Baker v. Montgomery Cnty., 201 Md. App. 642, 670, 30 A.3d 267, 284 
(2011) aff'd, 427 Md. 691, 50 A.3d 1112 (2012); Erie Ins. Co. v. Chops, 322 Md. 79, 82–83, 91, 
585 A.2d 232 (1991); Daughton v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 198 Md. App. 524, 18 A.3d 152 
(2011); Scull v. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C., 76 A.3d 1186 (Md. 2013). The three Cort 
factors Maryland courts analyze are: 
(1) The presence or absence of an indication of legislative intent to create a 
private remedy; (2) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special 
benefit the statute was enacted; and (3) whether it is consistent with the 
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
plaintiff.  
Baker, 201 Md. App. at 670 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78); see also Scull, 435 Md. at 121, 
(noting that Maryland has adopted the same test applied by the Supreme Court to assess whether 
statutes contain an implied private cause of action). 
As to the first factor, the plain language of the MSA indicates that the Maryland 
legislature did not intend to preempt or exclude existing common law remedies available to 
individuals injured by fraudulent fundraising.108 When a statute declares a right that does not 
exist at common law, a cause of action arising from that right must be specifically authorized by 
that statute. See M.L.E. Actions § 7. However, Maryland common law does recognize causes of 
action based on fraud and misrepresentation; these are not new rights created by the MSA. 
																																																								
108  Indeed, “where the legislature enacts a statute establishing a means to enforce existing rights, there is no 
presumption that the statutory means is intended either as an exclusive remedy or to abolish other actions at 
common law or equity.” Jackson v. Callan Pub., Inc., 356 Ill. App. 3d 326, 336-37, 826 N.E.2d 413, 425 
(2005).  
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Moreover, “statutes are not presumed to make any alterations in the common law further than is 
expressly declared….” Richwind v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 672 (1994). Thus, the MSA need not 
explicitly create a private cause of action for Ms. Hodges and KDH to be able to enforce these 
rights.109 
Regarding the second factor, GiveForward financially profited from the use of KDH’s 
name and likeness in connection with the fraudulent fundraiser. Individuals who have been used 
to further such a fraudulent fundraising scheme are directly benefitted by the MSA’s statutory 
prohibitions on such abuses.110 Section 6-611 of the MSA specifically prohibits representations 
that “another person sponsors, endorses, or approves of a charitable solicitation, the sale of goods 
or services for a charitable purpose, a charitable purpose, or a charitable organization without the 
consent of the other person.” MSA § 6-611(a). Thus, the legislature clearly intended to protect 
not only defrauded donors but also individuals who improperly were used to further fraudulent 
fundraising schemes – like KDH – and KDH is a member of the class this statute is designed to 
benefits. 
As to the third factor, it is consistent with the purposes underlying the legislative scheme 
to permit the victim used to further fraudulent fundraising to bring suit against those who 
perpetrated the fraudulent fundraising. As discussed above, the overarching purpose of the MSA 
is to increase donor confidence. The more confident donors are, the more they are willing to 
donate. It defies reason that an individual who is unwittingly used to solicit funds fraudulently… 
																																																								
109  “Courts discern from legislative intent whether a private cause of action was intended by analyzing the language 
of the statute to identify its purpose and intended beneficiaries, reviewing the statute's legislative history, and 
determining whether the statute provides otherwise an express remedy.” Baker, 427 Md. at 710. 
110  GiveForward also directly benefits from the MSA’s statutory prohibitions on fraudulent fundraising. See Ctr. 
for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Athey, 37 F.3d 139, a144 (1994) (“the state’s regulatory efforts…also benefit charities 
seeking to solicit in Maryland by eliminating illegitimate charities and enhancing public confidence in charities. 
As a result, the level of charitable giving will tend to increase, as citizens are more likely to donate to charities 
that have been investigated and found to be reputable. In addition, each charity’s share of available funds may 
increase because, as illegitimate charities are weeded out, the amount of available funds will be spread among a 
smaller pool of charities.”). 
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3. GiveForward’s violations of the MSA are proof of its negligence. 
GiveForward argues that the only way in which its misleading affirmative representations 
and practices regarding its fraud prevention policies and the safety of its website, in violation of 
the MSA, can give rise to liability is if Ms. Hodges and KDH relied on these statements. This 
assertion misstates the significance of GiveForward’s affirmative representations. These 
statements created a misleading impression that GiveForward vets its fundraisers and that they 
are safe and legitimate. This misleading impression created donor confidence in the legitimacy of 
the KDH fundraiser, which facilitated and furthered its widespread dissemination and ultimate 
success. The Fourth Circuit has recognized the benefit that enhanced donor confidence yields to 
fundraisers. See Ctr. for Auto Safety Inc. v. Athey, 37 F.3d 139 n.9 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[B]y 
eliminating illegitimate charities and enhancing public confidence in charities…the level of 
charitable giving will tend to increase, as citizens are more likely to donate to charities that 
have been investigated and found to be reputable.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, GiveForward 
itself recognizes the importance of donor confidence in the safety and legitimacy of fundraisers. 
Erica Alhorn, GiveForward Director of User Relations & Fundraising Coach, discussed the 
connection between instilling donor trust and increasing donation amounts in an interview, 
noting that “the fundraising campaigns GiveForward supports often perform better when a 
fundraising coach has the opportunity to instill trust in a donor.”111  
Maryland courts recognize the legal principle that violation of a statute or regulation may 
be proof of negligence. See, e.g., Joseph v. Bozzuto Mgmt. Co., 173 Md. App. 305, 321-22, 
(2007); Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass’n, 421 Md. 355, 388 (2011). For this principle to 
apply, four factors must be met: (1) a violation of a statute or regulation; (2) a resulting injury of 
																																																								
111  “That human interaction is especially important when we’re answering ‘trust’ questions from potential donors. 
They’ll ask questions like, ‘Has this fundraiser been vetted? Why do they say the money is going to a particular 
expense?’ When we can help donors by providing this information, it builds confidence in GiveForward, but 
more importantly it builds trust in the campaigns we support.” See Hodges Mot. at 23-24, ¶ 63. 
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a type the statute or regulation was designed to prevent; (3) the plaintiff must be a member of the 
class the statute or regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the violation must constitute a 
breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. Joseph, 173 Md. App. at 321-22.  
GiveForward’s conduct in the instant case satisfied all four of these factors. First, 
GiveForward engaged in misleading practices and statements in violation of MSA § 6-607 and 
608. Second, KDH’s invasion of privacy and Ms. Hodges’ and KDH’s emotional distress 
resulting from the improper use of KDH’s name and likeness for financial gain are the types of 
injuries the MSA is designed to prevent. Third, as previously explained, KDH was used as a 
means to conduct fraudulent fundraising without his or Ms. Hodges’ knowledge or consent, and 
thus is a member of the class the MSA is designed to protect. See MSA § 6-611(a). Finally, as 
explained in the Counterclaims, as a professional solicitor, GiveForward owes a duty to the 
individuals whose image and likeness it uses to solicit funds. GiveForward breached this duty by 
failing to exercise any due diligence to ensure KDH’s information was used truthfully and 
consensually,112 and, in fact, by using KDH for its own financial gain. 
In order to establish that GiveForward was negligence, Ms. Hodges and KDH must show 
that: (1) GiveForward owed a duty to them; (2) GiveForward breached that duty (3); 
GiveForward’s breach proximately caused the harm suffered by Ms. Hodges and KDH; and (4) 
Ms. Hodges and KDH suffered actual injury. See, e.g., Troxel v. Iguana Cantina, LLC, 201 Md. 
App. 476, 495 (2011). 
GiveForward owes a duty to exercise reasonable care in making affirmative 
representations. As explained above, the MSA supplies the standard of reasonable care that 
professional solicitors such as GiveForward must exercise in making such affirmative 
representations: they must refrain from making false or misleading statements that would 
																																																								
112  See Countercl. ¶ 94. 
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influence donor activity. See Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. §§ 6-607, 608. GiveForward breached 
that duty by violating the MSA and creating a misleading impression that the fundraisers its 
supports have been vetted and are safe and legitimate. GiveForward creates that misleading 
impression, for example, by: 
 claiming on its website that using its GiveForward is “quick, easy, and secure,”  
 telling visitors to their website that there’s “no need to worry when creating or 
giving to a fundraiser,”  
 informing CNN Money that “GiveForward assigns a live ‘fundraising coach’ to 
each campaign, who both vets and guides the efforts,” and 
 claiming on its online support center that “GiveForward makes every effort to 
investigate suspect fundraisers…[and] has a due diligence process.” 
As explained above, the Fourth Circuit recognizes that vetting fundraisers increase 
donations. See Athey, 37 F.3d 139 n.9. GiveForward’s breach of its duty not to mislead donors 
regarding the legitimacy of its fundraisers proximately caused actual injury to Ms. Hodges and 
KDH. But for GiveForward’s misleading representations that its fundraisers are vetted, 
legitimate, and safe, the KDH Fundraiser would not have received the significant amount of 
donations and publicity it ultimately received,113 in the form of 1,523 separate page views on 
GiveForward’s website, 41 shares via Facebook, and 54 individual donations. 114  And it is 
entirely foreseeable that an individual used as a prop to defraud countless donors across the 
Internet would be harmed by GiveForward’s misleading representations. See Pittway Corp. v. 
Collins, 409 Md. 218, 246 (2009) (“The question of legal causation most often involves a 
determination of whether the injuries were a foreseeable result of the negligent conduct.”). 
GiveForward’s refers to only a single statement in its “Frequently Asked Questions” that 
allegedly disclaims responsibility for the accuracy of fundraisers. This disclaimer, which is 
																																																								
113  Again, the Fourth Circuit recognizes that vetting of fundraisers results in increased donor confidence and 
donations. See Athey, 37 F.3d 139 n.9. 
114  See Hodges Mot. ¶ 47.	
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buried on a subpage within GiveForward’s website that users must actively seek out, does not 
neutralize or negate the misleading impression created by GiveForward’s multitude of prominent 
statements regarding the safety of its website and vetting of fundraisers.  
Any disclaimers regarding GiveForward’s responsibility for the legitimacy of fundraisers 
contained in GiveForward’s Terms of Use are also ineffective. GiveForward does not require 
users to affirmatively check a box, click a link, or otherwise acknowledge assent to the Terms of 
Use, so courts treat them as “browsewrap” agreements. See, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 
668 F.Supp.2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (distinguishing “browsewrap” agreements from 
“clickwrap” agreements, “in which website users typically click an ‘I agree’ box after being 
presented with a list of terms and conditions of use”). In order for GiveForward’s Terms of Use 
to be binding on its users, they must have actual or constructive knowledge of their terms. Event, 
Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F.Supp.2d 927, 937 (E.D. Va. 2010) (emphasizing that “[m]ost 
courts” which have considered the validity of a browsewrap agreement have held that “the 
website user must have had actual or constructive knowledge of the site's terms and conditions”). 
In light of GiveForward’s emphasis on fundraiser security and the one-on-one interactions that 
fundraiser coaches have with users, a reasonable donor would not have actual or constructive 
knowledge of the fact that GiveForward actually does nothing to ensure fundraiser safety or 
legitimacy. Thus, the Terms of Use are inapplicable and ineffective to neutralize or correct 
GiveForward’s misleading representations. 
D. The Cases of Zeran and Okeke Are Inapposite 
GiveForward unwittingly relies on Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 
1997) and Okeke v. Cars.com, 40 Misc. 3d 582, 966 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2013) in 
support of its contention that, pursuant to the immunity granted by the CDA, GiveForward 
Case 1:13-cv-01891-JFM   Document 128   Filed 03/26/15   Page 47 of 54
45 
cannot be liable for its failure to verify the legitimacy of the KDH Fundraiser.115 However, like 
the other cases to which GiveForward clings, Zeran and Okeke are inapposite to this case. 
Like Nemet discussed previously, Zeran involves a claim of Internet defamation on an 
online bulletin board by an unknown third-party user. See 129 F.3d at 328. 116  Again, Ms. 
Hodges and KDH have not alleged a claim for defamation against GiveForward. Rather, Ms. 
Hodges and KDH have alleged that because GiveForward reaps profits from the fundraisers it 
hosts on its website, it has a duty to ensure those fundraisers are not fraudulent and a duty to 
acquire parental permission prior to spreading an 8-year-old child’s image on the Internet for 
financial gain. By contrast, the AOL bulletin board involved in Zeran was not a for-profit 
undertaking by AOL. It was a passive site where AOL users could post commentary fully subject 
to the constitutional right of freedom of speech. In the absence of any independent speech or 
content put out by AOL, it could not be liable for merely hosting those defamatory statements. 
However, as discussed extensively above, GiveForward created independent speech and content 
that is, in and of itself, actionable. 
Similarly, the cars.com website in Okeke was an online bulletin board site to which third-
party users could post used car sales advertisements. Like the KDH Fundraiser, the specific 
advertisement at issue in Okeke turned out to be fraudulent. However, unlike this case, there was 
no indication in Okeke that the website itself created independent content for or promoting the 
fraudulent advertisement at issue or that the website profited from the used car sales the occurred 
through the bulletin board it hosted. Nor is there any indication that the website made affirmative 
representations about the legitimacy of the advertisements. Thus, Okeke is unpersuasive. 
																																																								
115  See GF Mem. at 22-25. 
116  Even a cursory glance at Zeran reveals that it does not hold up to the advances in the Internet that have occurred 
over the last 18 years. GiveForward’s website is eminently more sophisticated and advanced than the old-school 
AOL bulletin boards. 
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V. GIVEFORWARD IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MS. 
HODGES AND KDH’S COUNTERCLAIMS. 
Setting aside the CDA Immunity Issue, in order to grant GiveForward’s Cross-Motion for 
summary judgment on Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Counterclaims, the Court would first have to 
find, as a matter of law, that there are no facts in evidence that would satisfy the elements of each 
Counterclaim asserted by Ms. Hodges and KDH.117 Moreover, as the party moving for summary 
judgment on Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Counterclaims, GiveForward bears the burden of showing 
the Court that there is no evidence to support the Counterclaims.118 GiveForward has not, and 
cannot, meet this burden, and its Cross-Motion seeking summary judgment on all Counterclaims 
must be denied. 
A. GiveForward Misrepresents Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Counterclaims. 
GiveForward’s Cross-Motion routinely and repeatedly misrepresents and 
mischaracterizes Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Counterclaims. 119  GiveForward excerpts certain 
language from the Counterclaim in an effort to show its entitlement to summary judgment, but in 
doing so limits the Counterclaims to a mere snapshot and takes them completely out of context.  
GiveForward erroneously argues that “the vast majority of Defendants’ claims center 
exclusively on Mr. Johnson’s false claim that KDH had a terminal heart condition.” 120 
Importantly, and as detailed extensively in Section II, GiveForward has unnecessarily narrowed 
the tortious conduct at issue to suit its mistaken argument that Ms. Hodges and KDH’s claims are 
premised on treating GiveForward as the publisher or speaker. The tortious content or conduct is 
much broader than the single lie that then-8-year-old KDH was dying of a terminal heart 
																																																								
117  See, e.g., Hodges Mot. at 26-28 
118  See id.; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). 
119  See GF Mem. at 14-15, 22-23, 36. 
120  GF Mem. at 14. 
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condition. Rather, the tortious content or conduct encompasses GiveForward’s independent 
creation of content that furthered the fraud and the invasion of KDH’s privacy. 
B. Ms. Hodges and KDH’s Abuse of Process Claim Passes Muster. 
Contrary to GiveForward’s assertions, 121  Ms. Hodges and KDH’s abuse of process 
Counterclaim does not fail. Under long standing Maryland law, there are three (3) elements to an 
abuse of process claim: (1) the defendant willfully used process after it had issued in a manner 
not contemplated by law; (2) the defendant acted to satisfy an ulterior motive”; and (3) the 
plaintiff was damaged as a result of the abuse of process. See Barnes v. Montgomery County, 798 
F. Supp. 2d 688, 693 (D. Md. 2011); Cottman v. Cottman, 56 Md. App. 413, 430 (1983). Not 
only did Ms. Hodges and KDH allege sufficient facts in their Counterclaim to support Count X 
for abuse of process, but Ms. Hodges and KDH have provided the Court with sufficient evidence 
to support their abuse of process claim. Specifically, Ms. Hodges and KDH have shown that: 
 Under the guise of engaging in settlement negotiations, GiveForward deceptively 
requested a written settlement demand from Ms. Hodges and KDH in order to improperly 
file the same with the Court (See supra at 10-11, n.31.) 
 GiveForward did, in fact, use Ms. Hodges and KDH’s written settlement demand to 
support its issue of process herein, surreptitiously suing Ms. Hodges and KDH while the 
parties were engaged in settlement negotiations. (See id.) 
 GiveForward’s purpose in doing so was to silence Ms. Hodges and punish and harass her 
for revealing GiveForward’s fraud and various other torts and statutory violations. (See, 
e.g., Countercl. ¶ 112.) 
 As a result of this lawsuit, Ms. Hodges has been forced to take time off work, thereby 
losing compensation and negatively affecting her professional reputation. (See Ex. 2.at 
11.) 
 Also as a result of the fraud, exacerbated by GiveForward bringing suit against him, the 
minor KDH has had to undergo therapeutic counseling because of his intense concern 
and fear that when they learn about the lawsuit, the individuals who donated to the KDH 
Fundraiser will come after him and Ms. Hodges. (See id. at 10-11) 
																																																								
121 See GF Mem. at 47-48. 
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 As a result of GiveForward filing suit, Ms. Hodges and KDH have incurred hard 
expenses to retain an electronic forensic expert to assist with the collection of ESI from 
GiveForward, discovery that GiveForward steadfastly refuses to produce. (See id. at 11.) 
The assertion that under Maryland law, the damages stemming from abuse of process 
must take the form of “an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff,” is not 
necessarily accurate. In fact, in State v. Rendelman, 404 Md. 500 (2008), the highest court in 
Maryland noted that “abuse of process occurs when a party has ‘wilfully misused criminal or 
civil process’ against another party for a purpose different than the proceeding’s intended 
purpose and thereby caused that party damage (e.g., arrest, seizure of property, economic 
injury).” 404 Md. 500, 517 n.9. (emphasis added) (citing Krashes v. White, 275 Md. 549, 555 
(1975) (referring to damages as “other special injury”). Though no technical seizure of person or 
property has occurred, there is clear economic injury to Ms. Hodges and KDH. 
Importantly, GiveForward’s continual reference to confidential settlement 
communications is a violation of the Rules and undermines the integrity of the legal system. 
Courts recognize the “importance of maintaining the confidentiality of settlement negotiations” 
because protecting these communications “encourages parties to enter into settlement 
agreements.” Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 466 (1998).122 The courts that have 
addressed the issue of admissibility of settlement communications have routinely struck 
settlement negotiations attached to or referenced in pleadings. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. v. 
Illumina, Inc., 2013 WL 3216087, at *1-3, 22 (D. Del. June 25, 2013) (granting plaintiff’s 
motion to strike references to settlement negotiations); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BCG 
																																																								
122  See also Bittinger v. CSX Transp., Inc., 176 Md. App. 262, 276-77 (2007) (“The purpose of Rule 5–408 is to 
encourage the settlement of lawsuits by ensuring parties need not fear that their desire to settle pending 
litigation and their offers to do so will be construed as admissions.”); Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence 
Handbook § 508(D) (3d ed.) (“Offers of compromise are excluded because public policy encourages 
settlement.”); Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, Jones on Evidence § 22:11.70 (7th ed.) (“If parties are 
permitted [. . . ] to put before the court through their pleadings the existence of settlement negotiations as a fact 
in support of the parties’ claim or defense, it circumvents the purpose of the Rule.”). 
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Partners, Inc., 2011 WL 3946581, *2 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2011) (striking references to 
settlement negotiations from amended complaint and noting that doing so “at this [pre-discovery] 
stage is not unusual”); Ogundule v. Girl Scouts–Ariz. Cactus Pine Council, Inc., 2011 WL 
1770784, *8-9 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2011) (striking exhibits to complaint that contained settlement 
material); U.S. ex rel. Alsaker v. Centracare Health Sys., Inc., 2002 WL 1285089, at *2 (D. 
Minn. June 5, 2002 ) (collecting cases).  
Though GiveForward initially claimed that it included these settlement communications 
to show the existence of a controversy, that claim is no longer viable. We are engaged in a costly 
controversy caused by GiveForward’s own tortious conduct and failures, and exacerbated by 
GiveForward’s suing an 8-year-old child at great expense to all parties. It is obvious from 
GiveForward’s cavalier and repeated use of these confidential settlement communications that it 
has no fear of reprisal for violating the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
VI. MS. HODGES AND KDH DO HAVE STANDING TO BRING THEIR 
COUNTERCLAIMS. 
A. Ms. Hodges and KDH Have Standing to Pursue their Counterclaim Under 
the Maryland Solicitations Act. 
GiveForward specifically argues that Ms. Hodges and KDH do not have standing to 
assert a claim under the Maryland Solicitations Act.123 However, as detailed above in section 
IV.C, that argument is mistaken. There is clearly an implied private right of action and KDH is 
of the class the MSA was enacted to protect. Moreover, the plain language of the MSA does not 
limit the remedies thereunder to actions by the Secretary of State and Attorney General. 
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed supra, Ms. Hodges and KDH do have standing to pursue 
their MSA-based Counterclaims and GiveForward’s Cross-Motion as to this point should be 
denied. 
																																																								
123  See GF Mem. at 16-17. 
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B. Ms. Hodges and KDH Also Have Standing to Pursue Their Counterclaims 
Based on GiveForward’s Affirmative Representations. 
Since GiveForward did not file a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), GiveForward’s 
standing arguments regarding the “fraud based claims”124 are more appropriately categorized as a 
challenge to Ms. Hodges and KDH’s ability to provide evidence satisfying each of the elements 
of those claims—specifically, in this case, reliance. A person whose name and likeness are used 
as a fundraising tool has standing to sue the fundraising service that financially profited. As 
discussed above at section IV.C.3, GiveForward’s breach of its duty as a professional fundraiser 
caused actual damage to Ms. Hodges and KDH. Therefore, they have standing to pursue their 
Counterclaims based on those Affirmative Representations. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons as well as those in Ms. Hodges and KDH’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Hodges and KDH respectfully request that the Court 
(1) GRANT their Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) DENY GiveForward’s Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
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124  See id. at 27 n.5. 
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